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The Houston Mutiny of 1917
Garna Christian
One of the deadliest race riots in the strife-ridden World War I
period, the Houston Mutiny, otherwise known as the Camp Logan riot,
resulted in more than twenty deaths and the largest number of executions
in the history of the United States military.
The mutiny occurred on the night of August 23, 1917, less than a
month after the Third Battalion of the African-American 24th Infantry arrived
in Houston, Texas. Companies I, K, L, and M, consisting of 645 enlisted men
and seven officers under the command of Col. William Newman, and later
Maj. Kneeland S. Snow, drew the assignment of guarding the construction
site of a National Guard encampment in a wooded area five miles west of the
city. Houston, which had rapidly developed into the largest municipality in
the state, encompassed the largest black community in Texas and bore the
image of a progressive and relatively racially-tolerant Southern city. The local
administration, supported by a booster press, keenly recognized the financial rewards of a military base and understood the necessity of cooperating
with the War Department in the garrisoning of black soldiers. The regiment,
composed largely of Southern recruits familiar with regional mores, had
compiled an envious military record of service in Cuba, the Philippines,
and Mexico. Nevertheless, Houston remained a thoroughly segregated
city and contained a typical share of bigots who placed their racial prejudices
above the collective welfare. The soldiers, while thoroughly professional and
disciplined, believed that their contributions to the security of their country
had earned them the respect of the populace and recognition of their constitutional rights.
A series of minor racial incidents preceded the mutiny. From the
first days, the enlisted men complained of racial slurs from white construction workers and harassment from the police and trolley conductors. On the
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morning of the riot, Houston policemen broke up a dice game of black youths
with gunshots and burst into the adjoining house of Sara Travers, forcing her
into the street in her bathrobe. Pvt. Alonso Edwards approached the scene
to question the procedure and was pistol-whipped by Officer Lee Sparks,
already under investigation for shooting a black suspect. Later that afternoon, Corp. Charles Baltimore, a military policeman, requested information from Sparks on the incarcerated Edwards. The officer clubbed and
fired shots at the fleeing Baltimore. Unfounded rumors of Baltimore’s
demise spread among the soldiers, prompting Snow to summons the
beleaguered corporal to appear before the troops. Nevertheless, the
soldiers remained sullen, moving the colonel to postpone a downtown
watermelon party, cancel passes for the night, and augment the camp
guards. Adding to the tensions, acting 1st Sgt. Vida Henry, later accused
of leading the mutiny, told Snow of possible trouble from the men.
Shortly thereafter, Snow witnessed a group of soldiers raiding
the ammunition tent, followed by a cry of an approaching mob. Soldiers
raced for their rifles, formed a defensive line within the camp, and a
hundred or more of the men marched armed toward the city. Probably
intending to attack the police station, the soldiers fired at persons along
the way. Guards from Camp Logan left their post after hearing shots from
the garrison area and apparently tried to join the march, killing a jitney
operator en route. Before the marches aborted, the firing claimed the lives
of fifteen civilians, including four policemen, and wounded twenty-one
others. The following morning, National Guardsmen, sent by Gov. James
E. Ferguson to establish order, found the bodies of several soldiers, one of
them Sergeant Henry.
Civil and military authorities proceeded to identify the culprits
and the causes of the mutiny. Fearing white retaliation, many blacks
sought to leave the city. Employers and city fathers hastened to curb the
exodus, while heartily applauding the War Department’s removal of black
troops from Texas. Indicted battalion members, accused of participating
largely because they missed roll call or were found off base the night of
the shooting, became enveloped in a civilian-military dispute over prosecution. The military ultimately won out. A local inquiry placed blame
squarely on the army’s lack of discipline, while acknowledging Sparks’
excessive use of force and Police Chief Clarence Brock’s lack of oversight.
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Col. G. O. Cress, Southern Department inspector, agreed on lack of
discipline, but thought discrimination the fundamental cause.
Colonel Cress’s broadened investigation led to more arrests and
the scheduling of three courts-martial at San Antonio between November
1917 and March 1918. U.S. v. Sgt. William C. Nesbit et al. tried 63 defendants
on charges of mutiny, murder, and felonious assault; U.S. v. Cpl. John Washington et al. judged fifteen members of the guard who abandoned Camp
Logan; and U.S. v. Cpl. Robert Tillman et al. heard later evidence on the
main column, incriminating 40 additional soldiers. Defense attorney Maj.
Harry H. Grier pinned responsibility on the deceased Henry, but argued
that most reacted from confusion and fear of comrades or a mob. The
prosecution argued equal guilt in a conspiracy to kill whites indiscriminately. The Nesbit and Tillman trials convicted 95, imposing twenty-four
death sentences and eighteen prison terms ranging from two to eighteen
years. The army carried out thirteen executions by hangings within less
than two weeks after the first trial. Public outcry from organizations such
as the NAACP and National Equal Rights League persuaded President
Woodrow Wilson to commute ten death sentences to prison terms the
following year. The Washington proceedings ordered five executions and
ten sentences of seven to ten years. President Warren Harding initiated
the clemency process that freed most prisoners within ten years and the
last by 1938.
The episode damaged race relations locally and nationally. An
investigator for the NAACP reported that numerous black Houstonians
refused to comment from fear of the police. Its organ, The Crisis, edited by
W. E. B. DuBois, emphasized the abusive treatment of the soldiers while
admitting the gravity of their deeds. Intensified race consciousness led
to the creation of a Houston chapter of the NAACP and the Civic Betterment
League of Harris County. The War Department disbanded the Third
Battalion after the war.
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The NAACP in the
Twenty-first Century
Dianne M. Pinderhughes
A version of this article appeared in the June 1995 issue of Focus, a publication
of the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies in Washington, D.C.
“The leadership was overly concerned with recognition from whites,
a concern that helped prevent the organization from taking a confrontational
stance. The program overly oriented to a middle-class agenda and not nearly
strong enough to the kinds of economic issues that mean most to workingclass black people. [And] the organization [was] too centralized.”
These views of the problems of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People are not those of a present-day critic,
reflecting on the Association’s recent woes. They were formed by Ella
Baker during her years as the NAACP’s assistant field secretary in 1941
and as National Director of Branches from 1943 to 1946, as summarized
in Charles Payne’s book I’ve Got the Light of Freedom, published in 1995.
Yet Baker’s assessment fits extraordinarily well with some of the issues
that have called into question the viability and continued relevance of the
NAACP as it faces its centennial in 2009.
During its first six decades, the NAACP pursued a program
that focused on an anti-lynching campaign, school desegregation, and
voting rights. Often working in coalition with other groups, the Association achieved many of its civil rights objectives. But from the 1970s, the
Association seemed to have stagnated and lost its vision.
In his short tenure as executive director of the NAACP, Ben
Chavis attempted to revitalize the Association by reaching out to a broader
constituency. He argued that class is a polarizing factor in the Association,
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